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1 Introduction 
 
China has developed into a world economic giant, overtaking US as the world’s largest 
economy (based on purchasing power parity1) in 2014, first time since starting market 
reforms in 19782. The economic growth of China has been on average 10% annually 
since the market reforms up to 2014, making it one of the world’s fastest growing 
economies. (Morrison 2015) 
 
The idea of RMB internationalization was triggered by Chinese leaders’ concerns over 
excessive dependence on the United States dollar (USD), especially after the global 
financial crisis (GFC) that unfolded in 2008. China wants to be part of reforming the 
international monetary system (IMS) by integrating its own currency into the global 
economy to balance the power of the USD. Several other reasons play a role in the goal 
of an international currency, for example the fact that RMB’s status does not match that 
of China’s economy. 
 
Many questions arise from China’s efforts to make the RMB an international currency. 
The first being, what is the motivation behind RMB internationalization and what is the 
strategy for achieving the goals – is it based on market forces or government strategy? 
A political economy background is important to understand China’s view on US dollar 
dominance and RMB underutilization despite being the largest economy and trading 
nation in the world. China’s RMB strategy is based on two tracks: the use of RMB in 
cross-border trade settlement and the creation of an RMB offshore market. What China 
is trying to do is unprecedented: it is the first time an emerging country which seeks to 
establish a truly international currency where there is no link, even residual, between 
reserve currency and gold. (Subacchi 2010) The offshore RMB markets have a special 
                                               
1 PPPs are the rates of currency conversion that equalize the purchasing power of different 
currencies by eliminating the differences in price levels between countries. The major use of PPPs 
is as a first step in making inter-country comparisons in real terms of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and its component expenditures. GDP is the aggregate used most frequently to represent 
the economic size of countries and, on a per capita basis, the economic well-being of their 
residents. Calculating PPPs is the first step in the process of converting the level of GDP and its 
major aggregates, expressed in national currencies, into a common currency to enable these 
comparisons to be made. (OECD 2015) 
2 China’s economic reform process began in December 1978 when the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
proposals. Implementation of the reforms began in 1979. 
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role in China’s pursuits, especially focusing on the importance of Hong Kong as a 
strategic partner. The admittance to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of reserve 
currency seems to be an important milestone for China. (The Economist 2015) The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved RMB as a reserve currency in November 
2015.  
 
Although China has set a goal of RMB becoming an international currency, no official 
timetable has been announced. This means China is taking a gradual approach to 
achieving its policy goals, utilizing the unique relationship with Hong Kong and other 
offshore hubs to test the markets before fully liberalizing its own financial market.  
 
1.1 Objectives 
 
China’s attempts to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) have significant implications for 
the international monetary system and economies across the world. This thesis aims to 
give an overview of China’s renminbi strategy, focusing on the two tracks: the use of 
RMB in cross-border trade settlement and creation of an RMB offshore market. This 
paper analyses the unique strategy of the Chinese Government and attempts to 
understand the motivation behind RMB internationalization. The objective of this study 
is to identify the true intentions behind China’s RMB strategy from both historical and 
political points of view, and to provide an understanding of the macroeconomic and 
financial implications that arise from it. This study can provide a basis for further research 
about various topics, for example the competition between Asian financial centres and 
how the widespread use of RMB can help them develop new business areas. 
Furthermore, how is the RMB internationalization policy affecting China’s goal for 
Shanghai to become an international financial centre by 20203.      
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
The aim of the research is to find out how has China’s renminbi strategy developed. The 
first chapters serve as an introduction to the topic. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the 
renminbi, chapter 3 defines the concept of international currency. The thesis is then 
                                               
3 In the spring of 2009, China’s State Council announced its plans to transform Shanghai into 
an international financial center by 2020. Currently that role (among Asian countries) is held by 
Hong Kong. 
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divided into two parts: The first part (chapters 4, 5, 6) explores how China plans to 
achieve RMB internationalization, given its unprecedented status and lack of a clear road 
map. The second part (chapter 7) tries to understand why RMB internationalization is an 
important policy goal for China. The research question is: How does China plan to 
internationalize the RMB and what is the motivation behind it? This research will 
provide a clear understanding of the actions by the Chinese Government, supported by 
the political economy analysis and the events in the global financial system that led to 
adopting this strategy. In order to answer the main research question, a series of sub-
questions will function as a guideline in the investigation: 
 
 What are the characteristics of an international currency? Does China meet the 
requirements for becoming an international currency? Why did China want RMB 
to be admitted to the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights? 
 What is the role of the Global Financial Crisis in China’s currency policy 
development? How has the perception of globalization changed after the GFC? 
Is China’s strategy a signal of national protectionism of its own economy, while 
executing internationalization on its own terms?    
 What political signals is China giving to the rest of the world? Has it started to 
challenge the United States and is it seeking greater influence on the world 
economy? 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
This thesis is an exploratory study based only on secondary research. Exploratory 
research is a suitable methodology for this type of research that aims to understand and 
give insight about certain situations or problems. The focus is on gaining familiarity about 
the subject, to be able to analyse and explain why or how something is happening. In 
this case: how is the RMB internationalization happening, the reasons for the chosen 
strategy, and moreover, the motivation to achieve such a policy goal. Conducted in order 
to determine the nature of the problem, exploratory research is not intended to provide 
conclusive evidence, but helps us to have a better understanding of the 
problem. (Saunders et al. 2007:134) The research relies on secondary data from 
relevant literature.  
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1.4 Limitations 
 
As the chosen methodology implies, the aim is to explore the research question and 
does not intend to give a final and conclusive solution to an existing question. This 
research can be used as a basis for more conclusive research. The topic of the thesis is 
current and evolving over time, which means new information will be emerging, allowing 
new discoveries in addition to the existing framework. The findings in this paper are not 
meant to provide a basis for decision making, but rather a guideline for further 
investigations in the future. The Chinese Communist Party has announced that by 2020 
the country will become a “moderately prosperous society in all respects, and by 2049, 
when the People’s Republic of China marks its centennial, the country aims to be a 
modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and 
harmonious.” (Xi - Xinhua, 2014) What it actually means in economic terms, is still subject 
to discussion, allowing further predictive research and analysis.    
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2 The Renminbi 
 
The renminbi - abbreviated RMB - is the official currency of the People’s Republic of 
China. The name literally means “people’s currency” in Mandarin. It was first issued in 
December of 1948 with the establishment of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), who 
acts also as the monetary authority of China. The ISO code for renminbi is CNY (an 
abbreviation for “Chinese yuan”), or CNH when traded in offshore markets (Appendix 1). 
The symbol for renminbi is the same as for the Japanese yen, ¥. 
 
Yuan is the unit of account, which means the currency is denominated in 1 yuan, 2 yuan 
etc. The paper money also comes in smaller denominations like fen and jiao. One yuan 
equals 10 jiao, which equals 100 fen. 
 
As of 2013, the renminbi is convertible on current accounts, but not capital accounts. 
China is concerned that the mainland financial system would be exposed to too much 
volatility if the capital account was fully opened. As a result, the currency trades with a 
narrow band specified by the Chinese central government. Until 2005, the renminbi was 
pegged to US dollar, now it has moved to a managed floating exchange rate based on a 
basket of currencies, not just the US dollar.  
 
It was a calculated political move to balance external pressures and internal constraints. 
China has taken an interventionist policy to the currency market, which can be used to 
favour Chinese producers and exporters. The United States government has argued that 
RMB is significantly undervalued against the dollar and that has been a major contributor 
to the large annual US trade deficits with China and a significant decline in US 
manufacturing jobs in recent years. (Yi, 2005) But the value of the renminbi has steadily 
risen since the exchange rate was restructured in 2005, it gained 33% against the dollar 
in a 10-year period (Gu, 2015) The US put China, among Japan, Germany, South Korea 
and Taiwan, to a new currency watch list, which monitors if their foreign exchange (FX) 
practices provide an unfair advantage over America. The US dropped its view that 
China’s currency is significantly undervalued, saying the Chinese yuan should continue 
to experience real appreciation over the medium term. (Mayeda, 2016)  
 
The exchange rate is one of the most important determinants of a country’s relative level 
of economic health. Exchange rates play a vital role in a country’s level of trade, which 
is critical to any country that participates in international trade. The exchange rate of the 
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renminbi is not only a relative price between domestic and foreign goods and services, 
it also serves as an indicator of the value of the currency. The renminbi is used as a store 
of value by the Chinese citizens, so to keep the public confident in the renminbi, it should 
not appear to lose value against other currencies.  
 
For this reason, China is keeping a tight control over the exchange rate, not allowing it 
to become a freely floating exchange rate. The goal of Chinese foreign exchange policy 
in the short and intermediate runs is to help maintain and support Chinese economic 
growth by promoting international trade and investment while at the same time 
minimizing the sensitivity and vulnerability of the Chinese economy to external 
disturbances and preserving autonomy in Chinese macroeconomic policies. In general, 
fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate discourage long-term cross-border investments 
as well as trade arrangements. Chinese exchange rate management aims at achieving 
a stable and sustainable long-term equilibrium in the supply and demand of foreign 
exchange, driven by the relative rate of inflation as well as changes in relative 
productivity, so that relative competitiveness may be maintained. (Lau, 2003)  
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3 The Concept of International Currency 
 
An international currency is one that is commonly used outside of a domestic country’s 
currency. All or part of its function — the classic three functions of money (unit of account, 
medium of exchange and store of value) — can be transferred to the international level. 
This concept based on monetary function was defined by Benjamin J. Cohen (1971) and 
refined by Peter Kenen (1983) into six combinations comprised of three functions of 
international currency in private and public transactions. These functions are 
summarized in Table 1 by Alex He (2015). 
 
Table 1. Roles of an international currency 
 
 
Economic and political determinants together define the concept of an international 
currency. Alex He (2015) in his research found that the fundamental determinants of 
international currency status are economic size, confidence in the currency and depth4 
of financial markets. In his study, he points out that the existence of well-developed and 
open financial markets are a prominent economic attribute of an international currency. 
For example, full development of the US financial markets after the creation of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913, as well as London’s financial markets in the 19th century, laid 
the foundation for the rise of the dollar and pound, respectively, as international 
currencies. In contrast, the tightly regulated financial markets in Japan and Germany 
were frequently referred to as the principal obstacles of the internationalization of the yen 
and the Deutschmark. Helleiner (2008) claims that political agencies can play a role in 
the construction of financial systems that support international currency leadership. An 
                                               
4 A deep market has a large volume of available financial instruments in specific markets 
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example of this is the creation of the Federal Reserve System which helped boost the 
USD’s international role.  
 
Based on the conditions discussed above, one can argue that the RMB certainly has the 
potential to evolve into a major international reserve currency. Its capacity to do so is 
underscored by the size of China’s economy, current account surplus and accompanying 
expectations for RMB appreciation. However, the full development of financial markets 
(characterized in particular by depth, liquidity5, dependability and openness), which 
China lacks, constitutes an indispensable precursor for an international currency. 
Furthermore, by the criteria of liquidity, breadth6 and openness, Chinese financial 
markets still have a long way to go before they catch up to those of other major currencies 
(Frankel, 2011).  
 
In 2011, the RMB was world payments currency number 21, with a 0.24% share of 
payments value, while China’s share in world trade was 11.4% in 2010. These figures 
show a clear underutilization of the RMB in relation to China’s economy. (SWIFT, 2011). 
In 2015, the RMB entered the top five of world payment currencies, overtaking both the 
Canadian dollar and the Australian dollar by value, it now takes position behind the 
Japanese yen, British pound, Euro and US dollar. Overall, global RMB payments 
increased in value by 20.3% in December 2014, while the growth for payments across 
all currencies was 14.9%. (SWIFT, 2015)  
 
3.1 Special Drawing Rights 
The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) were created by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1969 as a supplementary international reserve asset. The SDR is neither a 
currency, nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is a potential claim on the freely usable 
currencies of IMF members. Holders of SDRs can obtain these currencies in exchange 
for their SDRs in two ways: first, through the arrangement of voluntary exchanges 
between members; and second, by the IMF designating members with strong external 
positions to purchase SDRs from members with weak external positions. In addition to 
its role as a supplementary reserve asset, the SDR serves as the unit of account of the 
IMF and some other international organizations. Currently, the SDR basket consists of 
                                               
5 Liquidity of a financial market reflects a high level of trading volume turnover 
6 Breadth shows the availability of a broad range of financial instruments, including markets for 
hedging risk 
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the United States dollar, the European Union’s euro, Japanese yen, and pound sterling 
of the United Kingdom. China was admitted in the basket in November 2015. Effective 
October 1, 2016, the basket will be expanded to include the Chinese renminbi. The 
weight of the currency is based on the value of the issuers’ exports, the amount of 
reserves denominated in the respective currencies that were held by other members of 
the IMF, foreign exchange turnover, and international bank liabilities and international 
debt securities denominated in the respective currencies. The respective weights of the 
US dollar, euro, Chinese renminbi, Japanese yen, and pound sterling are 41.73 percent, 
30.93 percent, 10.92 percent, 8.33 percent, and 8.09 percent (IMF, 2015).  
Previous to the IMF’s decision becoming finalized, there was a lot of debate whether the 
RMB fulfils the two criteria set by the IMF. The issuing country must be a major exporter, 
and the currency must be freely usable. No one disputes that China meets the first 
criterion. Over the past five years, its exports averaged 11% of the global total. That 
places it behind the European Union and America but well ahead of Japan and Britain 
(Economist 2015). The second criteria is that the currency must be freely usable, which 
was the source for debates. If freely usable is understood as fully convertible, the yuan 
would not make the grade. China places caps on how much cash its residents can take 
out of the country; forces international companies to do extensive paperwork before 
bringing large sums in; and limits foreigners to strict quotas for investing in its capital 
markets. (Economist 2015) Many, however, expected the IMF to massage its rules and 
to make an exception for China. The world’s coming economy has already fostered a 
host of offshore RMB centers, from Hong Kong and Singapore to London and Frankfurt. 
Foreign corporates have raised debt in the currency, while institutional investors' appetite 
for assets held onshore in RMB grows by the year. (GlobalCapital, 2015) 
The IMF’s decision will help pave the way for broader use of the renminbi in trade and 
finance, securing China’s standing as a global economic power. Many central banks 
follow this benchmark in measuring their reserves, which countries hold to help protect 
their economies in times of trouble. By adding the renminbi to this group, the IMF 
effectively says that it considers the currency to be safe, reliable and freely usable. The 
designation is a point of pride for Beijing, which had made it one of its highest economic 
policy priorities. The renminbi’s new status “will improve the international monetary 
system and safeguard global financial stability,” President Xi Jinping of China said in 
mid-November of 2015. (Bradsher, 2015) 
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Chovanec (2015) argues that it doesn’t matter if China is included in the SDR, it’s not 
going to be a financial or economic game-changer, but a political gesture. Any country 
that wants its currency to actually function as an international reserve must supply the 
rest of the world with claims in that currency, either by running trade deficits or by 
providing large amounts of aid or investment capital. Until now, at least, China’s 
development model has been based on precisely the opposite: running trade surpluses 
and attracting foreign investment. In the process, rather than exporting its own currency, 
it has imported an astonishing $4 trillion (down to of $3.23 trillion in January 2016) in 
other countries’ currencies, which it holds as central bank reserves.  
 
China has been recording a consistent trade surplus since 1995, which increased 10 
times from 2004-2009. China’s trade surplus came in at USD 29.86 billion in March of 
2016, up significantly from a USD 3.08 billion surplus reported a year earlier. (Trading 
Economics, 2016) Figure 1 shows the changes in China’s balance of trade in a 10 year 
period. 
 
Figure 1. China Balance of Trade (Trading Economics, 2016) 
 
As a non-OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) country, 
China’s growing foreign aid has been having a significant impact on the landscape of the 
global development community. Chinese foreign aid has become a formidable 
alternative to existing Western aid. Although China has been involved in regional 
financial cooperation for the last 15 years, its recent minilateral initiatives (explained 
further in chapter 7.1), such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, are far more China-centred, 
showing a shift towards a more activist foreign policy. (Wang, 2014) These developments 
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support the view that China is strengthening its position in Asia, experimenting with 
regionalization before pushing for a more international strategy (explained further in 
chapter 5.1). China provided 89.34 billion RMB (about $14.4 billion) in foreign assistance 
through grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans in the three-year period from 
2009-2012, making it the world’s 10th largest donor. (Taidong, 2014) China’s cumulative 
foreign aid between 1949 and the end of 2009 was 256.29 billion RMB (around US$43 
billion using the exchange rate of 2009). This means that more than a quarter of the aid 
provided by China from 1949 to 2012 happened during the last three years of that 
period. (Sun, 2015)  Africa and Asia remain the two largest recipient regions of China’s 
foreign assistance. Just over half of the aid, 51.8 percent, went to Africa, a 6-percent 
increase from 2009, while 30.5 percent of aid went to Asia, a 2-percent drop from 2009. 
It is also interesting to note that the share of China’s aid to Europe has increased from 
0.3 percent in 2009 to 1.7 percent for the three-year period. Given the limited number of 
developing countries in Europe, this is a rather large increase. (Taidong, 2014)  
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4 China’s Ambitions for an International Currency 
 
China has come a long way since initiating economic reforms in the late 1970s, and is 
now a key player on the international stage. China’s economic growth has been on 
average 10% annually since the market reforms up to 2014, making it one of the world’s 
fastest growing economies. It even overtook US as the world’s largest economy (based 
on PPP) in 2014. China became the world’s largest exporter of goods already in 2009, 
overtaking Germany. China became the world’s largest trading nation in 2013, overtaking 
the United States. (Monaghan, 2014) It is also holds the largest share of foreign 
exchange reserves of $3.23 trillion in January 2016 (down from $4 trillion the year 
before), more than double Japan’s, which has the world’s second largest amount. 
(Bradsher, 2016) Yet, the currency does not reflect such a prominent role.  
 
Key countries in international trade tend to use their currency to invoice and price 
transactions, as was the case for Great Britain when it controlled 30% of the world 
exports in the pre-World War I period (Eichengreen, 2005: 4), and is the case for the 
United States nowadays, as 95% of US exports are invoiced in dollars. (Goldberg and 
Tille, 2005: 19). The extensive international use of the dollar also supports the 
development of dollar-denominated banking and financial instruments, both onshore and 
offshore. China’s lack of international currency keeps it from benefiting from gains that 
are associated with the use of a country’s own currency in international trade. It also 
creates a mismatch on China’s international balance sheet, between liabilities that are 
typically denominated in RMB and claims on foreigners which are typically denominated 
in major reserve currencies, in particular the dollar. China suffers from over-reliance on 
the dollar, with the risk of excessive exposure to liquidity shortages within the world 
economy and the consequent reduction of trade finance. This was the lesson learnt from 
the 2007–08 financial crisis. (Subacchi, 2010)  
 
The Government of China has not revealed its strategy or even publicly addressed the 
process of internationalization. In the case of China, internationalization follows the 
model of gradual and manageable approach, which they have been using since they 
started the market reforms. What China is doing to develop the RMB into an international 
currency is unprecedented, it is the first emerging country that seeks to establish a truly 
international currency. This means China does not have a road map or any previous 
experience to rely on. From past examples, most countries had fully developed before 
starting the currency internationalization, they had convertibility and an open capital 
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account before their currency became internationally used, not the other way round. 
China is the first country attempting the internationalization of its currency in the era of 
true fiat money where there is no link, even residual, between the reserve currency and 
gold. This means that the RMB has to ‘go head to head’ with the dollar; its credibility 
cannot be established by comparing the convertibility of both currencies to gold, as had 
happened when the dollar took over from sterling. The RMB can only be compared to 
the dollar, i.e. to the incumbent reserve currency itself. Establishing credibility and an 
international reputation for the RMB, and making it acceptable in those parts of the world 
economy where the dollar dominates, will take years. The People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) is well aware of the difficulties inherent in the internationalization of the RMB, 
and this is why Beijing is cautious in assessing the chances of success and is trying to 
avoid creating expectations that are too high. (Subacchi, 2010) 
 
China is set to internationalize the renminbi through the liberalization of the current 
account, without opening the capital account (Appendix 2). Yet China has taken 
important steps to expand access to its domestic capital markets, indicating that an 
open capital account is a possibility in the future. According to PBoC governor Zhou 
Xiaochuan, the capital account convertibility China is seeking to achieve is not based 
on the traditional concept of being fully or freely convertible. Instead, drawing lessons 
from the global financial crisis, China will adopt a concept of managed convertibility. 
(Wildau, 2015) China is tackling an economic phenomenon called the impossible 
trinity7, which means a government can only control two out of the three factors at the 
same time: a fixed exchange rate, independent monetary policy, and an open capital 
account. (Figure 2)  
 
                                               
7 Also called “the unholy trinity” and the “trilemma”. Popularized by economists Robert Mundell 
and Marcus Fleming in the 1960s. 
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Figure 2. The Impossible Trinity (source: Kinsella, 2009) 
 
No country has managed to have all three, all attempts in the past have ended in 
disaster8. China is trying to adopt a partial variation of the impossible trinity to allow all 
three conditions to exist at the same time by having a limited independence of 
monetary policy, strongly managed exchange rate and partially open capital account. 
Only time will tell if China is able to solve an economic puzzle that no one ever has 
before. 
 
An open capital account and a deep and liquid capital market are clearly important to the 
Chinese authorities, but how to achieve it is less clear. The attempt to create an 
international and eventually fully convertible currency through a policy-driven process is 
unprecedented – nothing like this has ever been tried before, even partially. Beijing is 
openly aware of the fact that there is no road map to guide this process. From the 
economic perspective, the Chinese Government does not follow the ‘normal’ way to 
achieve currency internationalization, but uses a different approach. In 2009, the 
people’s Bank of China (PBoC) piloted reforms through cross-border trade settlements 
and establishing offshore RMB markets, while the domestic financial system was still 
                                               
8 The Mexican peso crisis (1994-95), the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the Argentinean financial 
collapse (2001-02) are examples of crises caused by violations against the impossible trinity. 
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strictly regulated by the government. (See Appendix 3 for a timeline of reforms initiated 
by PBoC). China proceeds with the strategy to internationalize their currency with the 
two-track road. Past experience (Japanese yen9 and the euro in Germany10) does not 
seem to support this strategy. Indeed, it suggests the opposite: a fully open capital 
account and a fully convertible (Appendix 4) currency are necessary step towards 
currency internationalization. There is no extensive discussion on drawing a road map 
for currency internationalization, therefore, China cannot have a viable predetermined 
road map. This does not mean that China’s strategy is fundamentally flawed. He and 
McCauley (2010) draw on the evidence of the Eurodollar11 market in the 1960s and 
1970s to argue convincingly that full capital account liberalization is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for substantial offshore use of a currency. Significant controls on capital by 
the US authorities from the 1960s to the early 1970s did not undermine the international 
role of the dollar and in some ways even gave a boost to the Eurodollar market. 
(Subacchi & Huang, 2012) The Eurodollar markets developed after 1957, when the dollar 
trade in London increased markedly and the British court had to decide how to deal with 
it. Surprisingly, the court concluded that the Eurodollar market was not subject to UK’s 
laws and regulations in case that both lenders and borrowers were non-British. This gave 
a competitive advantage to the London banks, which helped revive London as an 
international financial centre despite the weak pound. The Soviet Union used London’s 
banks for dollar deposits, because they did not want to risk that their dollar deposits in 
US banks to be frozen or seized in diplomatic conflicts. The US government tried to 
protest against the Eurodollar market, but then realised it made the USD even more 
attractive and decided to start competing with the market by establishing New York’s 
international banking facility system in 1981, hoping to retrieve the dollars deposited 
offshore. (Ylönen, 2006)  
 
There are other reasons to believe that China’s experiment is not doomed to fail. The 
Chinese economy has shown strong resilience to the economic and financial crisis and 
has been expanding at an impressive rate since 2009. Whereas the global economy 
shrank by 0.6% in 2009, China registered growth of 8.7%, and its economy expanded at 
                                               
9 The internationalization of yen was launched under US pressure, but Japan failed to promote 
yen internationalization as planned 
10 Germany succeeded in making euro an international currency, but on the expense of the 
Deutsche mark 
11 Eurodollars are US currency in the form of deposits and loans handled by commercial banks in 
Western Europe. 
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double-digit rates in the first half of 2010. China’s international position is stronger than 
before the crisis and the RMB, in particular, is in a comparatively better position vis-à-vis 
other currencies. Since January 2008 it has appreciated by 6.5% against the dollar and 
18.1% against the euro. (Subacchi 2010) China is taking policy-driven measures to help 
the market of international currencies to grow. Certain prerequisites are essential to this 
process, such as no restrictions on third-party use of the currency in contracts or 
settlements of trade in goods or assets, the existence of a deep and dynamic domestic 
financial market, a well-respected legal framework for contract enforcement, and stable, 
predictable micro and macro policies (Genberg, 2009). China’s assumption is that once 
these prerequisites are in place, the process will have enough traction to drive the 
market. China has accumulated a large and rapidly growing foreign debt. There are 
concerns that if the capital controls were abolished, there would be large-scale capital 
outflows and further currency appreciation.  This could produce a tightening of financial 
liquidity, as central banks would have to sell FX reserves in order to protect the currency 
peg (Chancellor, 2013) 
 
From the market point of view, policies can support the currency internationalization, but 
cannot drive it. The scope and size of the Chinese economy provides certain incentives 
to encourage market players to use the RMB, for example companies who seek to enter 
the Chinese market will be asked to use RMB for trade settlement. (Subacchi, 2010) 
 
China’s goal, at least initially, is to achieve currency internationalization under controlled 
convertibility in order to maintain economic autonomy. To achieve this, China is pursuing 
a two track strategy. The first track is aimed at increasing the use of the RMB in 
international trade, the second at turning the RMB into a currency that non-residents are 
willing to hold. This is a policy-driven strategy, with measures specifically designed for 
each track (Table 2). The implementation of the scheme has resulted in a strong growth 
in the use of the renminbi. In the first six months of 2012, almost 11% of China’s imports 
and exports were settled in RMB, a significant increase compared to the whole of 2010, 
when it was only 2%. (Subacchi & Huang, 2012) 
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Table 2. Reforms to internationalize the renminbi 
 
Source: Subacchi, 2010 
 
The next chapter will look into the two-track strategy, assessing the policy goals and 
steps taken so far.  
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5 China’s two-track strategy  
5.1 Trade Settlement in RMB 
 
In July 2009, the cross-border RMB trade settlement policy was launched. This is a 
strategy to develop the RMB as a currency used in international trade. The first track is 
focused on developing the RMB as a medium of exchange in the form of invoicing for 
trade and financial transactions for both residents and non-residence. The cross-border 
RMB trade settlement scheme was originally limited to five pilot cities, but was 
broadened to include 20 provinces12 and cities in the mainland in 2010. The scheme 
began slowly picking up since 2010, as the RMB could be used to invoice 40-50% of 
China’s imports to other Asian countries and about 20-30% of its exports from them. 
Building on the existing ‘Asianalisation’ of the RMB (Seade et al., 2010) and its rather 
limited circulation in China’s neighbouring economies (Gao and Yu, 2009: 15), and using 
policy measures as well as market traction to accelerate the use of the RMB across the 
region, China’s strategy appears, at least for some years, to be regional rather than 
international. It was an important experiment, both for testing the market and establishing 
its role as a leader in the region, which allowed a familiar ground to experiment with 
policies before going global. (Subacchi 2010)  
 
According to the trade settlement scheme, currency conversion between the yuan and 
other currencies is allowed only under the following circumstances (Yu, 2012):  
 
• Cross-border trade settlement in yuan up to the amount of the relevant transactions;  
• Yuan trade finance loans where the customer does not have sufficient yuan for 
repayment;  
• Expenses relating to yuan bond issuance to be settled in Hong Kong, China; and • 
transactions allowed by the PRC’s authorities to be ultimately squared by the yuan 
clearing bank—Bank of China, Hong Kong (BOCHK) in the PRC’s Foreign Exchange 
Trading Centre in Shanghai.  
 
To maintain control over the net cross-border flows of yuan between the PRC and Hong 
Kong, China, all cross-border yuan flows must be settled via the BOCHK (Figure 3) 
 
                                               
12 Beijing, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Chongqing, Xichuan, Yunnan, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Xizang 
(Tibet) and Xinjiang 
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Figure 3. RMB settlement system 
 
With this reform, China fully opened its current account to all companies in mainland 
China with import and export qualifications, to make and receive payments in RMB for 
goods, services and other current account transactions with their counterparts all over 
the world. China’s strategy of internationalization is therefore built on the current account. 
There has also been progress in capital account liberalization with Overseas Direct 
Investment13 (ODI) and Foreign Direct Investment 14(FDI) schemes, which can be settled 
in RMB.  
 
Yu (2012) draws attention to the matter of exchange rate arbitrage15, due to the 
distinction of the CNY and CNH (see Appendix 1) markets, which allows Chinese 
enterprises to benefit from the exchange rate arbitrage. On the surface, the trade 
settlement scheme merely allows the PRC enterprises to use yuan to settle their trade 
transactions. In reality it enables enterprises, especially large enterprises with 
                                               
13 The scheme, introduced in January 2011, permits Chinese domestic institutional investors to 
make RMB-denominated direct investments in select offshore enterprises or projects for 
greenfield investment, merger and acquisition, equity participation, and other means of acquiring 
direct ownership or actual control (PBoC, 2011). 
14 The scheme, introduced by the PBoC in October 2011, offers direct investment opportunities 
in the mainland’s real economy for overseas RMB holders. In July 2012, the PBoC restricted 
investments in the areas of securities, derivatives and property. 
15 Currency arbitrage means taking advantage of exchange rates in different money markets by 
buying it in one currency market and selling it in another market. 
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subsidiaries outside borders, to channel funds across the border between the PRC and 
Hong Kong, China. The starting point of yuan internationalization is supposed to be the 
use of the yuan for import settlement. But in practice, many PRC importers did not use 
the yuan to pay for their imports—let alone to use the yuan for invoicing. Instead, they 
utilize the opportunity provided by the trade settlement scheme, to conduct exchange 
rate arbitrage.   
 
To promote the international use of RMB, China has signed currency swap agreement 
with 31 countries since 2008 (Table 3). Beijing has embraced the swap agreements as 
long term means to expand the use of its currency without significant changes to its 
capital account. The original purpose of currency swap agreements is to provide 
countries with liquidity in times of crisis. For example, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
Asian countries, including China, entered into swap agreements under the framework of 
the Chiang Mai Initiative16. In the 2008 financial crisis, the United States conducted 
currency swaps with several countries, such as Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and Singapore, 
mainly to provide US dollar liquidity for those countries. Some of the swap agreements 
are denominated in US dollars while others are in local currencies. But none of the swap 
agreements under the Chiang Mai Initiative have been activated yet. (Yihong, 2015) 
 
                                               
16 Chiang Mai Agreement, also called Chiang Mai Initiative, set of bilateral currency-swap 
arrangements established at Chiang Mai, Thailand, in May 2000 by the members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the addition of Japan, China, and South 
Korea (collectively referred to as ASEAN+3). The agreement was meant to complement the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) by providing emergency infusions of foreign currency to 
member countries suffering from liquidity crises. 
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Table 3. China’s swap agreements and its counterparties
 
Source: Yihong (2015) 
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This kind of liquidity swap arrangement allows PBoC to provide liquidity support to its 
counterparts. Foreign banks sell a specified amount of their currency to the PBOC for 
yuan, at the market exchange rate. Yuan funds obtained by foreign central banks are 
deposited in accounts held with the PBoC as PBoC liabilities. (Yu, 2012) 
 
The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) stated that those swap agreements were intended 
not only to “stabilize the international financial market,” but also to “facilitate bilateral 
trade and investment.” Since these swap agreements are denominated in RMB and the 
local currencies, without involving the US dollar, it shows the counterparties’ willingness 
to hold RMB. For example, South Korea, one of China’s largest trading partners, is willing 
to have freer access to the RMB mainly to finance bilateral trade. It first signed a swap 
agreement with China in December 2008, and has renewed and expanded the swap 
amount several times. (Yihong, 2015) The swap agreements also reflect how China is 
utilizing its political power instead of market forces to enforce the international use of the 
RMB.  
 
5.2 The Creation of RMB Offshore Market 
 
China’s offshore RMB business hubs are independent of China, which is a positive 
attribute. This allows them to be under different regulations and have more freedom 
than if they were within the mainland. China then realized it would be to its benefit to 
keep currency used inside and outside of its borders separate. There are two notations 
for their currency, both of which are still the same Chinese Yuan: CNY is RMB for use 
inside of China and CNH is RMB for use outside of the borders (See Appendix 1). The 
reasoning behind this is to match the different supply and demand needs inside and 
outside of mainland China. Keeping the currencies separate also helps China to avoid 
unwanted transactions of transferring and converting the currencies back into China. 
 
Building the offshore market is essential to overcome the renminbi’s limited convertibility 
and broaden its use outside mainland China. In this market non-residents have access 
to the Chinese currency for the purpose of trade and investment and are encouraged to 
hold RMB funds while China’s monetary authorities retain control over the pace of the 
capital account liberalization (He and McCauley, 2010). Building the RMB market is likely 
to progress in a different way than the Eurodollar market in 1950s and 1960, which 
expanded outside the jurisdiction and control of the United States. For the time being, it 
will continue to be driven by China’s policy initiative, constrained by the currency’s limited 
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convertibility. By taking this roundabout approach, China is able to protect its domestic 
financial market, until it has sufficient depth and breadth to be fully liberalized, while 
securing their currency’s international expansion. Given China’s rapid economic growth 
and many trade and investment relationships, there is plenty of demand from the around 
the world for renminbi transactions. 
 
The liquidity required by the offshore market can either be generated through cross-
border operations of banks and other financial institutions or be provided by the monetary 
authorities (or a combination of the two). Because of the renminbi’s lack of convertibility 
and its limited use in international trade, in the current phase of development the offshore 
market has to rely on liquidity provided by the PBoC. (Subacchi & Huang, 2012) This 
means that the development of the offshore market is a policy-led initiative, which is 
expected to develop in a gradual pace. Essentially, China wants to remain a closed 
economy, but establish its goal of RMB internationalization through offshore hubs. Using 
this policy allows the Chinese government to keep control of its own economy and test 
the market before opening its economy further. 
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6 Hong Kong’s Role in Expanding Offshore RMB Business 
 
Hong Kong plays a very important role in helping China achieve its policy goals. Hong 
Kong has a unique position in developing the RMB business, it is both an international 
and an offshore market of China where the Chinese government can experiment with 
policies and reforms. Hong Kong operates under the “one country, two systems 
framework”, which means special administrative regions (SAR) such as Hong Kong and 
Macau can retain their own capitalist economic and political systems, while the rest of 
China is a socialist republic run by a single communist party. Back in 1978 when the 
mainland government started economic reforms, Hong Kong was the first to collaborate 
and assist China in its policies. In the 1990s China needed to raise capital and Hong 
Kong seized the opportunity. In 1993 the Hong Kong Stock Exchange allowed the listing 
of state owned enterprises of China and that formally opened the door for mainland 
Chinese companies to list in Hong Kong. Since the listing of the first mainland company 
in 1993, mainland enterprises have raised a total of 2,9 trillion HKD from the HK stock 
market. (Lam, 2014) Hong Kong was also the first to offer RMB Liquidity Facility and 
provide non-resident investors with additional liquidity, giving the city a competitive 
advantage over other financial centers. As shown in figure 4, Hong Kong can now 
provide RMB products and services for cross-border trade settlement, finance and 
wealth management (Subacchi & Huang, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4. Hong Kong: the most comprehensive renminbi offshore center. Source: HKMA 
(2012) 
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Because of the history of a successful partnership, it was a logical step for mainland 
China to choose Hong Kong as a testing ground to establish the RMB bonds market. 
The dim sum bond market is the first offshore market for Chinese currency investments. 
Dim sum bonds are bonds that are denominated in RMB and issued in Hong Kong. Dim 
Sum bonds are issued mainly by large entities based in China or Hong Kong, but 
multinational firms are issuing more in the growing market. In the past it was difficult for 
foreign companies to gain exposure to RMB denominated assets and dim sum bonds 
now offer a way for these companies. Dim sum bonds offer these companies a way 
around China’s capital controls because all that is required is that the issuers acquire a 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) settlement account. This makes the dim sum 
market very attractive to foreign issuers. Usually Dim Sum bonds are short term, with 
most being less than three years. Companies can choose to issue longer bonds if 
desired. For example, Asia Development Bank issued a ten-year bond in 2010. Along 
with varying lengths, companies can also issue dim sum bonds in two different ways. 
Dim Sum bonds can be issued either as Eurobonds17 or existing medium term note18 
programs. However, there is one key difference between Eurobonds and Dim Sum 
bonds and that is the manner in how the payback occurs. Payments for Eurobonds are 
normally paid in the currency that the bond was dominated. On the contrary, dim sum 
bond payments can be paid in currencies other than the currency that it is denominated 
in. Many times these bonds are paid back in US dollars.  
 
There are two types of Dim Sum bonds, retail and synthetic. Retail bonds were the first 
to be issued in 2007. Retail bonds are settled in RMB. Between 2007 and 2011, retail 
bonds were only allowed to be issued by locally incorporated subsidiaries of PRC banks 
and were limited by an annual quota system. These bonds were subject to approval by 
the PRC Central Bank, PRC National Development, and the Reform Commission. 
However, many of the regulations on these bonds have been lifted. The first nonfinancial 
institution to issue retail bonds was Baosteel Group Corp in 2011. The second type of 
dim sum bond are synthetic bonds. Unlike retail bonds, synthetic bonds are settled in 
currencies other than RMB. Hopewell Highway Infrastructure was the first company to 
issue synthetic bonds in 2010. Since then many multinational companies have issued 
synthetic bonds including McDonald’s, Caterpillar, Volkswagen, and British Petroleum. 
These bonds have growing popularity with more than two dozen Eurobonds issued today 
                                               
17 A bond that is denominated in a currency not native to the issuer’s home country. 
18 A debt note that has a 5-10 year maturity, but the term can be less than one year or as long as 
100 years. 
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(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2012). The creation of the dim sum market has transformed the 
core business of Hong Kong as an international financial center, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Structural shift in Hong Kong’s bond market. Source: HKMA (2016) 
 
Hong Kong is the largest dim sum bond market outside mainland China. (Figure 6) The 
outstanding bonds amounted to RMB367 billion yuan at end of October 2015. (HKMA, 
2016) 
 
 
Figure 6. Renminbi bonds outstanding in Hong Kong. Source: HKMA (2016). 
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Hong Kong has by far the largest offshore liquidity, handling 70% of all renminbi 
payments globally. (HKMA, 2016) While Hong Kong remains the most important offshore 
RMB hub, it is now facing competition from Europe and the Americas. 
 
6.1.1 Expanding the Offshore Market in Europe 
 
The first RMB denominated bond was issued in Luxembourg by a European issuer 
Volkswagen in 2011. In 2014, the first RMB bond by a Chinese mainland company 
issued inside the Eurozone was listed in Luxembourg. (Luxembourg For Finance 2015) 
European hubs are fueling RMB internationalization. SWIFT’s (2014) RMB Tracker 
shows that Europe represents 10% of Renminbi payments worldwide in value. In 2014, 
four European countries have been settling into the top 10, excluding China and Hong 
Kong. The United Kingdom leads Europe with 123.6% growth between July 2013 and 
July 2014, followed by France (+43.5%), Germany (+116%) and Luxembourg 
(+41.9%). Since July 2013, European payments directly exchanged with China and 
Hong Kong in RMB have increased by 105%, showing a considerable upwards trend in 
RMB usage. With the appointments of the clearing banks for Frankfurt (Bank of China), 
London (China Construction Bank), Seoul (Bank of Communications), Paris (Bank of 
China) and Luxembourg (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) by PBoC in the 
second half of 2014, it is becoming increasingly apparent that PBoC is seeking to 
accelerate the RMB internationalization process through offshore hubs (Heiniger, 
2015). This has spurred competition between financial centers to become the main 
RMB hub in Europe, supporting China’s efforts to internationalize its currency.  
 
Establishing a European RMB hub allows China to take advantage over the time zone 
difference with Asian centers, allowing a 24-hour trading. International financial 
centers, which are outside the jurisdiction of China, prefer a market driven approach, 
which may cause problems for the development of the European hubs, because they 
have to take into account China’s unique policy-led strategy of internationalization. 
While the offshore RMB market has the potential to expand in size and scope, the pace 
of development will largely depend on Beijing’s policy – and politics – on capital 
account liberalization. Capital liberalization is a critical decision for the Chinese 
authorities and it is unlikely that the current pace of gradual opening will be 
accelerated. (Subacchi & Huang, 2012) 
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6.2 London 
 
London, which already handles 40% of global foreign exchange trading, wants to build a 
dominant position in offshore renminbi trading in Europe. China and United Kingdom 
have an agreement since 2013 which allows UK based financial institutions to directly 
invest in Chinese equity and debt markets. The president of PRC, Xi Jinping, visited the 
United Kingdom in October 2015. During the four-day state visit, China chose London 
as the first international financial hub to issue renminbi-denominated Chinese sovereign 
debt. It is a deal that marks a major milestone in the renminbi’s arrival as a major currency 
on the world stage. This will be the first time that renminbi-denominated Chinese 
sovereign debt will be available outside of Chinese borders, opening up an international 
renminbi debt market. (Panda, 2015) Soon after the announcement of opening the new 
sovereign debt market in London, China was admitted to the IMF’s SDR in November 
2015. 
 
Offshore hubs are essential to China’s renminbi strategy. Currently, the RMB offshore 
market is organized around Hong Kong. At least at this stage, therefore, the development 
of London and other financial centres (outside China) that plan to be part of the RMB 
offshore market will be complementary to that of Hong Kong. While London and other 
international financial centres such as Singapore will develop as RMB hubs, Hong Kong 
is likely to be an RMB offshore centre. The offshore hubs worldwide are the connecting 
dots in the expanding RMB offshore market (Subacchi & Huang, 2012). 
 
London is far from the only city trying to develop closer ties to China. Germany, China’s 
biggest European trade partner, was awarded a quota of 80 billion yuan ($12.9 billion) 
that allows European investors to buy securities in China. The allocation is similar to 
arrangements for France, South Korea and the U.K., which was the first country other 
than Hong Kong to win a quota. Like London, Frankfurt has agreements with the PBOC 
to get a share of the offshore renminbi market. (Detrixhe, 2015) A day after China issued 
the first sovereign bond from London, China and Germany have formally agreed to 
establish a Frankfurt-based exchange to trade a host of renminbi-denominated products, 
in a further sign of Europe’s aggressive courting of Beijing for financial business. (Jones, 
2015) 
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7 Understanding the Motivation behind RMB Internationalization 
 
China has never published a formal policy document to outline the RMB 
internationalization program. It is mentioned in the official statement called the 12th Five 
Year Plan19, published in 2011, that the general aim is to over time increase exchange 
rate flexibility and making the renminbi fully convertible, but no specific timeline was 
given. The government leaders and top officials of PRC have rarely touched the subject 
in their speeches or interviews. This means that understanding the motivation behind the 
internationalization requires further investigation.   
 
The main interpretation of what initialized the RMB internationalization is believed to be 
a response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that unfolded in 2008. The idea of RMB 
internationalization was triggered by Chinese leaders’ concerns over excessive 
dependence on the US dollar. The crisis affected China’s economy greatly, cross-border 
trade fell, inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) declined and GDP growth slowed 
down. In March and April of 2009, the PBoC published on its website a series of papers 
by PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan arguing that the global financial crisis stemmed in 
large part from the impossible demands placed on the US Federal Reserve, whose 
monetary policy could never satisfy both the needs of the US economy and the needs of 
the rest of the world, for which the US dollar was the primary currency. That was the first 
time China started lobbying for a reduction of the USD’s global role and push the 
renminbi as an alternative major reserve currency (Kroeber, 2013). 
 
Apeldoorn, Graaff & Overbeek (2014) argue that the growth of China’s economy is better 
understood in the context of resistance to Western supremacy. It is pointed out that there 
have been other challengers in the past, who have been showing promising results in 
overtaking the West, but somehow never get so far due to the structural constraints of a 
state-led system. The authors claim that China’s current socialist structure is limiting 
capitalist development, but leaves an open question if China really is ready to sacrifice 
resurrection of socialism in China to achieve its aspirations to overthrow the Western 
supremacy. Ian Bremmer states (2010: 5) that the ultimate motive of state capitalism is 
not economic (maximizing growth) but political (maximizing the state’s power and the 
leadership’s chances of survival). 
                                               
19 China’s Five Year Plans are a series of social and economic development initiatives which 
serve as roadmaps for the nation’s development. 
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While RMB internationalization is a goal in itself, it is also used as a tool to reform the 
domestic financial system, specifically liberalizing the capital account, exchange rate and 
interest rate. (He 2015) The domestic reforms have slowed down since 2005, after 
shifting from a fixed exchange rate to a managed rate. On the widely-used Chinn-Ito 
index20, China is one of the least financially open major economies in the world, and is 
no more open now than it was in 1993 (Prasad and Ye 2012). The reforms piloted in 
2009 established cross-border trade settlements and the creation of an offshore RMB 
markets, while the domestic financial system was still strictly regulated by the 
government. (See Appendix 2 for a timeline of reforms initiated by PBoC). These reforms 
acted as catalysts to push the domestic market reforms. For example, the establishment 
of an offshore market allows China to determine the true price of its currency. Interest 
rates for renminbi debt securities in Hong Kong are set by market supply and demand, 
rather than by government fiat. Once the offshore market gets big and liquid enough, its 
prices can start to affect the prices of loans and debt securities onshore (Kroeber, 2013). 
McCauley (2011) explains that the offshore renminbi market—if it gets big enough—can 
be a mechanism by which capital controls are broken down, and the central bank 
becomes more responsive to market movements when setting interest rates, and by 
extension the exchange rate. 
 
In an extensive study called RMB Roadmap (2014) conducted by industry experts at 
ASIFMA21 highlights some reasons why RMB internationalization is a major goal for 
China: 
 
a) Currency risks for both importers and exporters are reduced if the RMB is 
internationally accepted as a trade settlement currency. China has the world’s second-
largest economy, and by some measures, China is the world’s largest trading nation – 
thus, this is a major benefit. 
b) Given China’s position as the world’s largest holder of FX reserves the bulk of which 
are in USD (which is the dominant international reserve currency), China’s exposure to 
                                               
20 An index measuring a country’s degree of capital account openness 
21 ASIFMA – Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association is an independent, 
regional trade association with over 90 member firms comprising a diverse range of leading 
financial institutions from both the buy and sell side, including banks, asset managers, law firms 
and market infrastructure service providers. They promote the development of liquid, deep and 
broad capital markets in Asia.  
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USD exchange rate volatility will be considerably reduced if the RMB has a greater 
international role. China’s pace of USD accumulation will likely slow (or even reverse) 
once the RMB gains prominence as an internationally traded currency. 
c) Finally, on the key issue of the RMB becoming a reserve currency as the end objective 
of IMS rebalancing, there is now evidence that up to 40 of the world’s central banks in 
recent years have chosen to at least hold some of their reserves in RMB. This level of 
acceptance of the RMB on the part of the world’s central banks suggests that the Chinese 
currency is effectively a “de facto” reserve currency, even before it has become fully 
convertible – as the IMF has recently pointed out. ASIFMA experts believe that this trend 
is set to continue, as progressively more central banks consider holding RMB as part of 
their reserves diversification process 
 
Indeed, as mentioned previously (see Chapter 2.1) the IMF officially accepted RMB as 
a reserve currency, so China is well on its way to reach some of the goals set out years 
ago. Other economists, however, point out that RMB internationalization has not reduced 
China’s dependence on the dollar, but instead led the country to accumulate more dollar-
denominated assets, and so exchange risk rate has actually increased. (He 2015) China 
never strategically reduced its US Treasury reserves, but instead continued to increase 
holdings, reaching a record high US$1.3 trillion by May 2013, and as of September 2014 
still remains the number one foreign holder of US Treasury securities (Department of the 
Treasury 2014). Krugman (2009) points out, “China now owns so many dollars that it 
can’t sell them off without driving the dollar down and triggering the very capital loss its 
leaders fear.”  
 
One feasible way to eliminate the dependence and the dollar trap is to promote the RMB 
to an international status. Some economists in China argue that as a long-term strategy, 
RMB internationalization should be the correct way to eliminate its dollar dependency 
(He 2009; Xiang 2011; 2013; Cao Yuanzheng 2014). Although the process will take 
years or even decades, and will bring large economic costs, such as reducing export 
competitiveness and compromising monetary policy independence, it is still the right 
solution for stepping out of the dollar trap. In the long run, it can bring vast political and 
economic advantages. (He, 2015) 
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7.1 The True Intensions behind RMB Internationalization 
There has been debate if China actually wants a fully open capital account and a global 
currency. An economist at UBS thinks: “China’s goal is eventual full capital account 
convertibility, which one day will see the full convergence of the onshore and offshore 
RMB market.” (GlobalCapital 2015) Others are not so sure. Jonathan Anderson from 
Emerging Group Advisors says: “From a pure macro point of view, China isn’t quite sure 
that it wants a fully open capital account. The capital account isn’t quite as closed as it 
used to be but it’s still pretty closed. I don’t think anyone in China is that interested in a 
full opening while they are trying to deleverage the economy.” Beijing’s true intent, he 
argues, is to increase foreign investment in the domestic equity market, while 
triumphantly securing admittance to the SDR basket. (GlobalCapital 2015) 
RMB internationalization would bring China political and economic benefits, but most 
importantly, China needs to focus on domestic reforms. That would explain why China 
is taking a unique approach to internationalize the RMB through offshore markets. Wu 
Xiaoling (2014) says that it is clear that the ultimate goal of China’s financial reform is in 
fact not RMB internationalization itself, but is instead the building of a moderately 
prosperous society by 2020. He emphasizes that the PBoC is paying more attention to 
how to promote market-based domestic financial reform, rather than how to push the 
RMB toward becoming an internationalized currency, and, thus, the era of the RMB is 
yet to come. 
 Recently, China has accelerated its engagement in minilateralism, which is the 
gathering of a sub-group of countries within or outside a multilateral institution to solve a 
problem when the multilateral institution is unable to reach agreements among its 
members. (Wang 2014) Financial minilateralism is not new: the G722 and G2023 are 
examples of such cooperation, but within the last years China has accelerated its 
participation in such activities. The world is still recovering from the GFC, countries are 
dealing with tensions coming from short-term domestic priorities and long-term 
international objectives. The perceived benefits of economic globalization have begun to 
be clouded by an increasing body of research that links the processes of global economic 
liberalization with increasing income inequality, and long-term unemployment and 
                                               
22 G7 are the world's seven most industrialized economies: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
US, UK and Canada. 
23 G20 is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 of the world's largest 
economies, and the European Union. 
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underemployment in developed economies. (Herman 2011) According to Wang (2014) 
China has three goals in pushing for minilateral financial cooperation schemes: to 
stimulate reform of global multilateral institutions; to provide under supplied public goods 
for member countries and other developing countries; and to directly promote China’s 
economic interests and its political standing. China’s leadership does not seek to 
overthrow the existing multilateral framework, but if China and other emerging 
economies are increasingly compelled to go outside the existing multilateral system to 
fulfill their needs and aspirations, their actions could weaken the established multilateral 
institutions of global financial governance. State capitalist countries are not anymore 
“driven by alliance with superpower or by ambitions to join established power’s club” but 
have desires to make new rules in the global markets. (Bremmer 2012: 55) 
For many years the Chinese government sought to “join the world” by learning and 
selectively following the international rules established by the West (Economy and 
Oksenberg 1999). Now China’s relations with the world have entered a new stage, where 
China is actively trying to participate in the making of international rules. Its foreign policy 
strategy is gradually moving away from “keeping a low profile” toward “trying to 
accomplish something.” (Wang 2014)  By establishing new minilateral relations China 
can exercise financial leadership in the Asia-Pacific area, while with the RMB’s 
admittance to the SDR confirmed, China is now becoming more influential in the global 
level.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
Despite its prominent role in the world economy, China does not have a currency that 
can be used as a unit of account, means of exchange and store of value in 
international transactions. China has taken a policy led initiative to promote the 
internationalization of RMB, the strategic path chosen by China is unprecedented, 
lacking a clear road map to guide the process.  RMB internationalization is a major 
challenge for the PRC. However, there is no firm answer about the final goal of the 
internationalization. Since there is a lack of a clear road map toward 
internationalization, China is essentially experimenting and taking a unique approach, 
trying to make the RMB international without it being fully convertible. China is trying to 
expand the use of its currency through trade settlement, swap agreements and 
investment facilities without opening up its capital account. The RMB 
internationalization process will continue with setting up more RMB offshore markets in 
European cities, but also in the Americas. By creating offshore hubs gradual 
enlargement of international use of RMB is promoted and China gets closer to the 
objective of eliminating dollar dependence, while still having a strong grip on the 
domestic economy.  
 
With the admittance to SDR, RMB has equal status with the dollar in the global 
monetary system, a symbol which is highly regarded by China. RMB 
internationalization is a long-term process that will take years and possibly even 
decades. China is taking a gradual approach to reforms, as it wishes to maintain 
control over the process, without opening its domestic financial market. So far the PRC 
has been artificially pushing the use of RMB through favorable policies and political 
influence. In order for RMB internationalization to take a natural course, the 
liberalization of capital account is required. For that to happen, China needs to reform 
its domestic financial market first. China has favorable conditions, such as the growing 
economy and trade volume to support the RMB internationalization. It lacks, however, 
deep and liquid financial markets. Until China makes significant reforms to its domestic 
market, the process of internationalization will not be likely to make a breakthrough and 
instead will continue in small sequences, such as the two-track road so far. 
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